Doris Schroeder, human rights do not derive from human...

Doris Schroeder, human rights do not derive from human dignity. Schroeder states that human rights must be separate from human dignity for three reasons: First, the justification paradox which is the concept that dignity does not solve the justification problem for human rights; instead it worsens it in secular societies. Second, Kant’s cul-de-sac: the notion that if human rights are based on Kant’s concept of dignity rather than theist grounds, those rights would lose their universal validity. Third, hazard by association: human dignity is more controversial than the concept of human rights, especially between aspirational dignity and inviolable dignity (Shroeder, 2012). Schroeder elaborates on the justification paradox by†¦show more content†¦334). While this creates a perfect case for the separation of human dignity from human rights, it is not a strong enough argument. From another perspective, rights, defined in â€Å"Western tradition† are theorized as â€Å"protecting interests, or as the normative control of a sovereign†, but in terms of human rights, â€Å"human rights are grounded in human dignity† (Van Duffel, 2013, p. 647). Human dignity is the foundation which other human rights build upon. These are clear cut. In other words, one either has them or doesn’t, no middle ground. These rights are grounded in the basic idea that one has them simply because one is human. And, because of this notion, this would also suggest that only humans have human dignity – which is protected through human rights (Van Duffel, 2013). In response to Doris Schroeder, Peter Schaber argues all three points are not convincing. For the justification paradox, â€Å"any religious understanding of dignity is just one among many other understandings of dignity. Schroeder mentions five different concepts of human dignity of which only one is based on religious convictions† (Schaber, 2014). For the second point of Kant’s cul-de-sac, Schaber mentions that the Kantian proposal suggests that humans have rights in virtue of their capacity for moral-self legislation.